How to Keep Your Monthly Budget?

Personal budget consists of assets and liabilities, that is, out of disposable income part. Purpose of budget planning procedure is the most rational and effective use of cash receipts, contributing to early achievement of financial goals, getting rid of debts, increasing cash and tangible assets, that is, improving financial condition of a person.

So, how to keep personal budget for a month? Here are 10 steps to compiling personal budget.


FINANCIAL CRISIS And Its Influence on the Internet Speedy Loans: Introduction

East Asian crisisFurman and Stiglitz (1998, pp. 12) stress that any credible explanation of the East Asian crisis must account simultaneously for the crisis and for the region’s precrisis record of growth and stability. Their own explanation (pp. 13-20) roots the crisis in government financial policies and not in the management of foreign-trade regimes, international liquidity, or monetary and fiscal aggregates. Furman and Stiglitz blame East Asian governments for:

1. Undertaking rapid financial and capital-account deregulation without addressing the concomitant need to beef up their supervisory capacity; and

2. Failing to be “aware” of the systemic risk posed by the growing possibility that the massive precrisis inflows of private capital into their countries might fail to earn returns large enough to service the foreign debt being generated.

The explanation tendered in this paper supplies an agency-cost and contestable-markets perspective on these so-called policy mistakes. The agency-cost part of the argument portrays the crisis as the fruit not of blindness, but of time-inconsistent policy gambling. It rejects the hypothesis that East Asian authorities could have truly blinded themselves to the growing vulnerability imposed on their banking systems by booking loans dictated by political pressure at par. Instead, the analysis substitutes the more reasonable hypothesis that authorities had this guilty knowledge and responded to this information myopically by gambling that deregulation would enable their insolvent banks to grow their way out of trouble. The operative strategy had two components: helping to cover up the losses imbedded in bank loan portfolios and enabling their banks to compete more aggressively for domestic savings and foreign funds. We cannot make nowadays big purchases with the immediate paying for it. But with the help of the information on this web site you may take a loan for this realization. you shouldn’t waite for a long to receive the confirmation but be attentive there are so many swindlers in the Internet ready to cheat.

The regulatory-gambling model treats the decision to poorly supervise financial and capital-account liberalization as a purposeful rather than inadvertent move.

Regulators and politicians hoped to preserve the rents earned in the past by directing cheap loans to politically powerful parties and sectors. These hopes were encouraged by high precrisis rates of economic growth and by the obvious difficulty of establishing the purposefulness of their scheme if the strategy failed.

The contestable-markets part of the story sets this gamble in the context of the increasing globalization of fmancial-services competition. Year by year, offshore innovations in financial technology and regulatory systems have been expanding opportunities and lowering the costs for worried Asian citizens to move their wealth into foreign institutions. Viewed from this Schumpeterian perspective, the successive breakdown in the financial systems of the five Asian crisis countries was less a matter of Kindleberger-Minsky “psychological contagion” than the simultaneous destruction of longstanding government efforts to wall out foreign competition. Advances in information and contracting technology made it easier for foreign firms to surmount barriers to entry in distant markets at the same time that improvements in Western regulatory systems made offshore institutions seem safer to Asian citizens than ever before.


business cycle modelsThis paper illustrates a particular limited information strategy for assessing the empirical plausibility of alternative quantitative general equilibrium business cycle models. The basic strategy is to test whether a model economy can account for the response of the actual economy to an exogenous shock. To be useful, this strategy requires that we know how the actual economy responds to the shock in question and that different models generate different predictions for that response. Here we concentrate on the response of aggregate hours worked and real wages to a fiscal policy shock. Real wages and real money are the same and even familiar events. When you receive the wage you spend it, pay for bills, buy food and different supplies but you do not spend it for yourself, this amount is not enough for satisfying these possibilities. not to be disappointed in case you cannot let yourself something new visit the web site and take a loan. you may borrow different sums of money. Really speaking everything is to your taste.

The fiscal policy shock is identified with the dynamic response of government purchases and average marginal income tax rates to an exogenous increase in military purchases.

Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999) (BEF) show that standard Real Business Cycle (RBC) models can account for the salient features of how hours worked and after – tax real wages respond to a fiscal policy shock, but only if it is assumed that marginal tax rates are constant. When this counterfactual assumption is abandoned, RBC models cannot account for the response of the economy to a fiscal policy shock. For example, high labor supply elasticity versions of these models counterfactually predict that after a fiscal policy shock, government purchases are negatively correlated with hours worked. In reality, after a fiscal policy shock, government purchases and hours worked are strongly positively correlated. Low labor supply elasticity versions of these models greatly understate the conditional volatility of hours worked. So regardless of what is assumed about the elasticity of labor supply, the model cannot account for the facts. Ramey and Shapiro (1998) show that various two sector versions of the RBC model generate predictions for aggregate hours worked and real wages that are very similar to those of the one sector model. So presumably these models too would fail our diagnostic test. Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) and Devereux, Head and Lapham (1996) study the effects of changes in government purchases in stochastic general equilibrium models which incorporate increasing returns and oligopolistic pricing. Since their models imply that a positive shock to government purchases raises real wages, they would fail our test.


ALL SCHOOL FINANCE: School Finance Equalization Schemes 4

Guaranteed Tax Revenue/Power Equalization Schemes

Like foundation aid schemes, guaranteed tax revenue schemes systemically transfer revenues from districts with high capitalization to districts with low capitalization. But, in addition to this systematic income effect, guaranteed tax revenue schemes directly change the tax price for local school expenditure that each district faces. This is because guaranteed tax revenue schemes make the amount of local revenue that a district has to raise in order to have a dollar of local expenditure into a positive function of the district’s per-pupil valuation.10 Depending on the details of the scheme, this function may also be quasi-convex or quasi-concave in т.

ALL SCHOOL FINANCE: School Finance Equalization Schemes 3

Under a foundation aid system, the tax price is one, just as under local finance and flat grant categorical aid. Foundation aid creates lump sum transfers that depend on districts’ property value per pupil:
The middle term of (12) is a just tax on housing and land service wealth, but the right-hand term of (12) is a tax on education tastes and school productivity.

Let us compare foundation aid to flat grant categorical aid that attempts to achieve similar redistribution. This comparison not only clarifies the economic issues (because it holds the redistributive goals constant), it is also a practical comparison. As an historical matter, Foundation Aid schemes generally replaced categorical aid schemes. Districts that receive money under foundation aid that would not have received money under categorical aid are districts in which households prefer to spend an unusually small share of their incomes on schools.

ALL SCHOOL FINANCE: School Finance Equalization Schemes 2

State aid affect district budget constraints through two means: the tax price a district faces and the lump sum amount of tax revenue that a district gives to, or gets from, the state. When we want to determine whether an SFE scheme levels up or down, it is intellectually very useful to break the problem into parts, (i) Relative to the scheme previously in place, does the SFE scheme contain lump-sum transfers among districts? If so,

(a) what would the effect of the SFE scheme be if it were, instead, a flat grant categorical scheme with the same redistributive goals?

(b) what are the differences that exist because the scheme is an SFE scheme and not a flat grant categorical aid scheme with the same redistributive goals?

ALL SCHOOL FINANCE: School Finance Equalization Schemes

So far, I have been describing the asset that conveys the fiscal externality as tangible property, but the asset could equally be something intangible but persistent, like a reputation for spending each tax dollar more productively. That is, school productivity is not only capitalized, but school districts with high productivity attract households whose taste for education is high.

It is worth noting that empirical evidence suggests that households with an unusually high demand for school spending relative to their incomes live in districts that have property prices that are unusually high given the properties’ characteristics and tax rates that are above-average, but not dramatically so.

In short, property values in a district reflect not just housing services, but (1) the productivity of schools, (2) households’ taste for education, and (3) the degree to which state law constrains households from exercising their most preferred level of school spending and taxes. (State law can also make households less constrained, as I emphasize below.) Of course, we do not observe the division of each property price into the part that is payment for housing and land services and the part that reflects the local public goods equilibrium.

ALL SCHOOL FINANCE: Some Useful Results

In order to understand school finance equalization, we need a few results from the Tiebout literature. First, in Tiebout equilibrium with local property tax finance, productivity differences between school districts are capitalized in house prices. If a district has a reputation for consistently being better run and using its money more efficiently than neighboring districts, households will be willing to pay more for houses in the district because the tax burden on homeowners will be small for any given level of school quality.
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Second, in Tiebout equilibrium with local property tax finance, households’ maximizing their utility is equivalent to households maximizing their property values. That is, households actually maximize their utility, but their actions are identical to those they would pursue if they were attempting to maximize their property values. If binding constraints are put on the property tax rates they can set or on the property values they can tax, their property values will end up being lower.

ALL SCHOOL FINANCE: Categorical Aid as an Add-On 4

A very simple guaranteed tax revenue scheme with two guarantees might have a budget constraint like:
That is, regardless of how much local tax revenue a district raises and what its local tax rate is, it will always get the basic guarantee. California has a minimum tax rate of 10 mils so that districts cannot opt out of local public schools. Since there is no incentive for residents of a district to ever let themselves be taxed at more than the minimum rate and local schools do not benefit directly from increases in local property values, it is not surprising that Proposition 13, which makes 10 mils the maximum tax rate as well as the minimum tax rate and prevents house values from being reassessed for tax purposes so long as they remain under the same owners, was passed in a referendum soon after the Serrano II equalization scheme was put in place. Fischel (1989,1994) explains the political process by which the Serrano II equalization led to Proposition 13. Thus, for equation (8), r”m—r/”®*. California’s formula was not initially self-funding because the state started with a large budget surplus. It has been more or less self-funding, however, in most years of its operation.
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ALL SCHOOL FINANCE: Categorical Aid as an Add-On 3

The stringency of a foundation aid program is greater as the foundation level,/ rises relative to per-pupil spending in the state (making / rise relative to r). A state that imposes a foundation aid program in which the foundation level is, say, at the 75th percentile of the per-pupil spending distribution is a state in which nearly all property taxes from nearly all districts have to go towards funding the foundation grant. In such a case, only few districts would want to set a rt higher than / in order to raise additional local revenue to pay for spending beyond the foundation level. It is, of course, theoretically possible to set /and/so high that no district wants to spend more than the foundation level.
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Below, I explain why foundation aid schemes are fundamentally different from, say, categorical aid schemes that attempt to achieve a similar amount of redistribution. This explanation only makes sense after a Tiebout-style model of school spending determination is presented (in the next section).

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